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THE TREATMENT OF SOME TRADITIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
IN THE NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
CHARLES A.

HECKMAN*

Some of the provisions of the North Dakota Century Code as
well as some collateral developments in sister states are capable
of generating considerable confusion in the distribution of intestate
estates. Since North Dakota has had relatively little litigation in
this area, its solutions to the problems are unclear, and the purpose
of this article is to analyze some of the alternatives available to
the practitioners and judges faced with a problem for which
there is no clear precedent. The following commentary may also
be useful to those engaged in estate planning, where the law of
intestate succession is sometimes relied upon for disposition of an
estate after the testator's specific requirements have been met.
I.

THE

SHARES OF

LINEAL AND

COLLATERAL

KINDRED--

PER STIRPES AND PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION

The proper method of distributing an estate among lineal and
collateral kindred has been extensively debated in the courts of
other jurisdictions. The discussion has centered on whether the
proper method of dividing the estate is per stirpes or per capita,
and if per stirpes, what the root generation must be.' Distribution
per stirpes involves distributing the estate by strictly dividing
the property according to the number of people contained in the
root generation, and preserving that allocation within each branch
of the family. The "root generation" is that generation which determines the number of equal shares into which the estate will be
divided, and in the case of strict per stirpes distribution is always
the generation closest to the decedent, children or brothers and
sisters, whether or not that generation has living members.' Thus
if A dies survived by no spouse and by three sons and the issue of
*
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a predeceased child, his estate is divided into four parts, one of
which is given to each son and one of which is given to the issue of
the predeceased child. The issue of the predeceased child are said
to take "by representation," i.e. representing their deceased ancestor
and taking the share he would have taken had he survived the
decedent. This result surprises no one and is automatically reached
under almost every statute. The harder case is presented when W
is predeceased by all of his children, and two or more of them
have children in varying numbers. Thus we reach the following
situation, where W dies and is predeceased by all three of his
children, X, Y and Z, but is survived by four children of Y,
two children of Z, and no issue of X. Even in jurisdictions which
generally distribute per stirpes, we reach the problem of where to
establish the root generation. If the root generation is taken to be
W's children, X, Y and Z, even though they all predeceased W,
then the estate is divided into two parts, and each of Y's children
takes one-eighth and each of Z's children takes one-quarter. Members of the root generation who predecease the decedent leaving
no surviving issue are not included in the computation in any
system we will discuss. Thus X is ignored in our example. This
pattern of distribution is used in jurisdictions which still adhere
to the strict interpretation of per stirpes distribution.3
The problem with the strict per stirpes solution is that it imposes
an unequal distribution among people who are otherwise equal.
We have no reason to create a legal presumption that W loved any
of his grandchildren less than any of the others, or that if he had
expressed himself he would have distributed his bounty unequally
among them. The result is that the courts in this country early
evinced a tendency to use as the root generation the first generation having members living, in the last example the grandchildren.,
Thus instead of having a pure per stirpes system which would
have divided the shares always at the level of the decedent's children, we frequently find a modified per stirpes system which skips
all generations down to the first having members. This system we
may call the modified per stirpes,5 although where that rule exists
it is merely referred to as taking per stirpes or "by representation"
as though there were no modification.
Because of the confusion caused by the judicial straining on
this issue many states attempted early to clarify the matter by
statute, and the result was frequently a statute which specified in
3. See the citations, id. at 577.
4. See In re Martin's Estate, 96 Vt. 455, 120 A. 862 (1923); Kn; pp v. Windsor, 6
Cush. (Mass.) 156 (1850) ; 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 425 (12th ed. 1896).
5. The terminology for these various systems may be found in a number of sources,
but the author has relied on Ingram & Parnall, supra note 1, for his source.
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some manner that if all descendants were of the same generation,
they took per capita (i.e., each took an equal share), but if they
were of different generations, they took per stirpes.6 A clear exposition of the modified per stirpes method is found in the Model
Probate Code, and reads as follows:
Meaning of representation. "Representation" refers to a
method of determining distribution in which the takers are
in unequal degrees of kinship with respect to the intestate,
and is accomplished as follows: after first determining
who are in the nearest degree of kinship of those entitled to
share in the estate, the estate is divided into equal shares,
the number of shares being the sum of the number of living
persons who are in the nearest degree of kinship and the
number of persons in the same degree of kinship who died
before the intestate, but who left issue surviving; each
share of a deceased person in the nearest degree shall in
turn be divided in the same manner among his surviving
children and the issue of his children who have died leaving
issue who survive the intestate; this division shall continue
until each portion falls to a living person. All distributees
except those in the nearest degree are said to take by repre-

sentation .7

Unfortunately, in attempting to enact statutes which were probably
trying to reach the result attained by the Model Probate Code, the
legislatures frequently left their language unclear, and the result
was language such as the following:
[I]f there is no child of the decedent living at his death,
the remainder goes to all of his lineal descendants; and if
all of the descendants are in the same degree of kindred to
the decedent they share equally, otherwise they take by
s
right of representation ....
The above language is taken from the California Code, but is shared
by various other states.9 It has given rise to various interpretations, but the most grotesque is the California doctrine expressed
in the case of Maud v. Catherwood.10 There the decedent had created
an inter vivos trust, the corpus of which was to be distributed upon
the death of his last surviving child. Upon the death of that child,
See, e.g., the states adopting the Field Code, CAL. PROBATE CODE § 221; IDAHO
6.
CODE § 14-103(1) ; N. D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(b) ; MONT. REV. CODE § 91-403(1) ; S. DAK.

CODE OF 1939 § 56.0104(1); see also a non-Field Code state, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
190 § 3(1).
(1946).

7.

MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22(c)

8.

CAL. PROBATE CODE § 221.

9.

See the Field Code states listeA supra note 6.
67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945).

10.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the surviving lineal descendants were those underlined on the chart
below:' 1
S. CLINTON AND AZALEA HASTINGS
Clara L.
Cathfrwood

Louise
C. Maud

Jennie S.
Catherwood

m

|

ll

Flora
(Keyes)

a

Caes
Catherwood

I

I

r

Lillie

Hoyt D.
Hastings

EH
Hastings

Paul

Ella

Robe

Chares F. D.

Crane

Harry C.
Hastings

Elizabeth
Parker
Hastings

Azalea

Lewenhaupt
JoehFiske
Ctrwood
Jan. ctaimir
Lewenhaupt

A strict per stirpes distribution in this situation would result in the
estate being divided into four equal shares, with Jan Casimir Lewenhaupt and Ethel H. Crane each taking one share, or one quarter
of the estate, and the others each sharing a full share (in the actual
case, each of the others takes one eighth). Marshall, Lillie and
Ella, of course, are ignored since they were predeceased without
surviving issue. Harry Hastings, Elizabeth Hastings, and Louise
Maud could point out that they were one step closer to the decedent
than Jan Casimir Lewenhaupt, and that there was no reason to
assume that the decedent intended any such discrimination among
his issue. They therefore contended that the root generation should
be their own, that of the grandchildren, rather than the children,
and that the estate should be divided into six equal parts, each
claimant taking one. That result, of course, would be reached in a
state having a modified per stirpes doctrine. The California Appellate
Court felt that the language of the statute, quoted above, dictated
that per capita distribution be used only when all heirs were of the
same degree of kinship to the decedent, and that when some takers
were of different degree the system reverted to a pure per stirpes
computation with the root generation being that of the decedent's
children. This result has been called a strict per stirpes rule with
Having reviewed the general patterns
a per capita exception. 12
of treatment of this question, we can now turn specifically to the
North Dakota treatment of the subject. Here we find that far from
attempting to provide any guidance to the bar as to which method
to use, the statute completely obscures the issue by providing no
less than three different treatments of the subject. Section 56-0104 (1) (a) provides:
1.
11.
12.

If the decedent leaves:
a. A surviving husband or wife and only one child, or

Id. at 64.0, 155 P.2d at 115.
Ingram & Parnall, supra note 1 at 574-76.
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the lawful issue of one child, in equal shares to the surviving husband or wife and child, or the issue of such
child. .. ."
This section provides no guidance whatsoever as to whether the
distribution should be per capita or per stirpes. The issue will arise,
of course, only if the surviving issue are great-grandchildren or
more remote, but such cases are not unknown, and it would be
helpful to know what the legislature intended.
Section 56-01-04 (1) (b) deals with the situation where the decedent
is survived by a wife and more than one child and the issue thereof.
In this section the operative language is nearly identical to that of
the California statute involved in Maud v. Catherwood:
[T]o the child or children living and to the lawful issue of
any deceased child by right of representation, but if there is
no child of the decedent living at the time of death, the remainder goes to all of the decedent's lineal descendants,
and if all such descendants are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent, they share equally, but otherwise,
they take according to the right of representation....
This provision would seem to demand the Maud v. Catherwood
solution if interpreted literally, but we shall deal with that question
later.
Section 56-01-04(1) (c) deals with the situation where there is
no surviving spouse, and reads:
[I]f such issue consists of more than one child living, or
of one child, or more than one child, living, and the lawful
issue of one or more deceased children, then the estate
goes in equal shares to the children living, or to the child
or children living and the issue of the deceased child or
children by right of representation, but if the decedent's
child or children shall be dead, but shall have left issue, all
the estate goes to such issue by right of representation. ...
This provision seems to require a strict per stirpes distribution.
Finally, the legislature apparently made some attempt to clarify
the subject by defining taking by representation:
56-01-13. "Inheritance by right of representation" definedStatus of posthumous children.-Inheritance of succession
by right of representation takes place when the descendants
of any deceased heir take the same share or right in the
estate of another person that their parents would have taken
if living.
Taken together, these statutes make a complete hash of the
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subject. As we have already noted, subdivision (a) provides no
guidance whatsoever. Subdivision (b) seems to admit of a Maud
v. Catherwood treatment, and subdivision (c), read literally, seems
to demand a strict per stirpes rule. Section 56-01-13 does not aid
us in our quest for enlightenment, for on its face it appears to
mean nothing at all.
To clarify the last statement first, section 56-01-13 really does
not define representation very clearly. If all of the heirs are
grandchildren, this section seems to indicate that they must take
per stirpes, not per capita, even though they are of the same degree
of kinship, whenever the statute speaks in terms of representation.
When we go beyond the level of grandchildren, however, to greatgrandchildren and beyond, the statute is of no help at all. Thus if
all heirs are great-grandchildren, all that we know is that each
takes the share his parent would have taken had the parent survived
the decedent. Although this language is not very helpful at first
glance, judicial interpretations have been placed upon it, which are
discussed below, which make it quite important in discussing the
other provisions.
If the above reasoning is correct, we are then forced to reach
an absolutely grotesque result if we interpret literally subdivisions
(a), (b), and (c). Let us take a family consisting of D, decedent, S,
spouse, children Ca and Cb, one child of Ca, Gca, two children of Cb,
GCbI and GCbII, child of Gca, GGCa, child of GcbI, GGCbI, and
two children of GCbII, GGCbIIa and GGCbIIb. The situation is
diagrammed below:

Ca

GCa

I

GGCa

Cb

GCBI

II

GGCbI

I

GGCbIIa

GGCbllb

First, for example 1, let us assume that Ca and all his issue and
Cb, GCbI and II all predecease D. If S survives, the estate will be
distributed under subdivision (a). At this point we have reached
the first anomaly. Until 1963, subdivision (b) provided that the
surviving spouse received one-third of the estate if the deceased
were survived by two or more children or their issue, whereas
subdivision (a) provided that the surviving spouse would receive
one-half if the deceased were survived by only one child or the
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issue of one child. In 1963 subdivision (b) was amended to increase
the share of the surviving spouse to one-half when the deceased
was survived by two or more children or their issue. 13 With that
amendment the difference in treatment of the surviving spouse
in the two subdivisions disappeared, as did the reason for having
two subdivisions; but although under either subdivision the surviving
spouse gets one-half and the issue get one-half, the subdivision under
which distribution is effected is still determined by the now irrelevant number of surviving children or issue thereof. Subdivision
(a) clearly should have been repealed at the time of the amendment to subdivision (b), and all reference to number of children
or issue thereof surviving should have been deleted from subdivision (b).
As the matter now stands, in Example 1 distribution will be
effected under subdivision (a). S will therefore receive one-half,
and GGCbI, GGCbIIa and GGCbIIb will split the other half between
them. But how? The subdivision is silent on the point. If the distribution is per stirpes, GGCbI will take one quarter and the others
one eighth each; if per capita, each takes one sixth. The subdivision is absolutely silent as to which method to choose, so one
might be tempted to say that we must interpret the subdivision
in such a way as to achieve results parallel to those achieved by
the other subdivisions. We therefore turn to subdivision (b).
In order to invoke the aid of subdivision (b), we will create
Example 2 and revive someone in the collateral branch of the
family, so GGCa is resurrected. Now we have four great grandchildren and a spouse surviving. Subdivision (b) is limpidly explicit: each great grandchild takes one-eighth. This seems to be
a felicitous result. There would be no reason to create a presumption
that the decedent loved one great grandchild more or less than
another. If he did have a preference he could easily have made
a will. Let us treat equals as equals. Now for Example 3 let us assume
that only the four great grandchildren survive, that the spouse
predeceased the decedent. Subdivision (c) governs, and the operative language is "(A) 11 the estate goes to such issue by right of
representation. . . ." Now GGCa gets one-half, GGCbI gets onefourth, and the remaining two great grandchildren get one-eighth
each. It is interesting that the law makes the touchstone for
equal treatment of issue of equal degree the completely irrelevant
factor of the survival of a spouse. For Example 4 the spouse is revived
again. Subdivision (b) governs. But let us also revive GCbI. In this
situation the heirs are now of unequal degrees of kindred, and we
are back with a Maud v. Catherwood situation. If we follow the
13.

Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 371, § 1.
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specific language of the statute, GGCa takes one-fourth, GCbI takes
one-eighth, and GGCbIIa and GGCbIIb each take one-sixteenth.
A great grandchild thus takes twice as much as the only surviving
grandchild, who is one kindred step closer to the decedent, and
four times as much as the other great grandchildren. Thus by
the terms of subdivision (b) equal taking by equals is made to
hinge on all heirs being of the same generation, which is surely an
irrelevant factor.
All one can do in looking at these provisions is to agree with
Dickens' Mr. Bumble that "If the law supposes that . . . the law
is a ass . .. .,14 The least we should expect of such a statute is
uniform treatment in all cases provided for under subdivisions (a),
(b) and (c). The ideal way to accomplish this, of course, would
be by legislative revision. Pending such revision, however, we can
at least try to see if the courts have any basis for interpreting these
statutes in such a fashion as to achieve fair and uniform results.
In interpreting these provisions, we have two major problems:
(1) interpreting the provisions of subdivision (b) so as to avoid a
Maud v. Catherwood result, and (2) interpreting subdivisions (b)
and (c) so as to achieve parallel results under their differing
provisions. If these ends can be accomplished, there would seem
to be no bar to interpreting the totally indefinite provisions of
subdivision (a) to conform to the other two.
It is desirable to avoid reaching the result obtained in Maud
v. Catherwood because that case reaches a result which is inequitable and which is not dictated by any logical necessity. In
both Maud v. Catherwood and in the example used above, reverting
to a per stirpes distribution any time the heirs are of different
generations resulted in heirs of a closer degree of kindred taking
less than those of a more distant degree. Since those of a nearer
degree are more likely to have known the decedent and to have
been held in affection and esteem by him, any artificial presumption which can result in the nearer degree taking less than a more
distant degree should be discouraged. Furthermore, it is a clear
policy of the law of decedents' estates that the nearer should
take before the more distant.
In light of the above policy arguments, it may be possible to
interpret the North Dakota Century Code to avoid reaching the
California result. Although the specific language of the North Dakota
Code seems to dictate this result, and it is the result reached by
the California courts on the basis of identical language, other courts,
notably in Massachusetts, interpreting statutes with strongly sim14.

DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST, ch. 51.
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ilar language, have managed to reach a result which results in
15
distribution per capita to the first generation with members living.
The factor militating in favor of North Dakota's adopting the
Massachusetts construction is the existence of section 56-01-13,
defining taking by representation as taking the share the predeceased parent would have taken had he survived the decedent. The
California statute defining taking by representation in Maud v.
Catherwood was phrased differently: "Inheritance or succession
'by right of representation' takes place when the descendants of a
deceased person take the same share or right in the estate of
another that such deceased person would have taken as an heir
if living.'1 6 This statute automatically, in the case of direct descendants, seems to place the root generation at the level of the
children of the decedent.
Section 56-01-13, however is substantially identical to the definition of taking by right of representation in force in Massachusetts
at the time of the decision in Balch v. Stone. 7 That case involved
the interpretation of language substantially similar to that of subdivision (b) and thus also substantially similar to the California statute on the same subject. The Massachusetts court managed to interpret its statute as always requiring the root generation to be the first
generation with living members, with the issue of predeceased
members of such generation taking by representing their ancestors
in the root generation. This interpretation, of course, stretches the
subdivision (b) language quite a bit. It was achieved partially on
the basis of Massachusetts legislative history which is, of course,
irrelevant in North Dakota; but it was also based on the language
of the Massachusetts equivalent of section 56-01-13. The Massachusetts court reasoned that by the plain language of the statute,
if the parents of the younger generation had all survived, the parents
would have taken per capita, since all heirs would then have
been of the same generation.1 8 Thus under the Massachusetts definition of "representation" as taking the parent's share, each child
takes per capita because his parent would have taken per capita.
The Massachusetts court thus managed to hold that using any
root generation save the first generation with living members would
prevent the younger members from taking per stirpes as dictated
by the statute.
15. Snow v. Snow, 111 Mass. 389 (1873) ; Knapp v. Windsor 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 156
(1850) ; Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889). The court in Maud v. Gatherwood found it necessary to consider and distinguish Balch v. Stone.
16.

CAL. PROBATE CODE § 250.

17. 149 Mass. 39. 20 N.E. 322, 325 (1889), interpreting Mass. Pub. Stat. Ch. 125, § 6:
"[I]nheritance or sucession by right of representation shall be deemed to take place when
the descendants of a deceased heir take the same share or right in the estate of another
person that their parents would have taken if living."
18. 149 Mass. at 498, 20 N.E. at 325 (1889).
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While one can only agree with the Massachusetts court's statement that there are difficulties with this interpretation (e.g., it is
still viable when dealing with heirs two generations apart, such
as grandchildren and great great grandchildren), it seems permissible to do at least this amount of stretching to achieve the more
equitable and uniform Massachusetts result.
Under these circumstances, it would appear that the North
Dakota courts are justified in adopting the Massachusetts interpretation as a matter of stare decisis, however to the extent that
the North Dakota language is drawn from the Massachusetts statute
we may also argue that the North Dakota legislature adopted the
Massachusetts judicial interpretation along with the language. 19
The question then becomes whether subdivision (c) can be interpreted in such a fashion as to achieve a parallel result. It is extremely desirable to interpret the two subdivisions in parallel fashion
so we can achieve the same method of distribution under each,
regardless of whether the spouse survives or not.
There appears to be authority for interpreting subdivision (c)
to achieve the same result as subdivision (b). Although a strict
per stirpes rule would supposedly not permit per capita distribution
at any point, courts in this country early decided that strict per
sgtirpes distribution would be avoided whenever possible, and that
the root generation would always be the first generation with members living, even though the statute involved adhered to the language of strict representation.2 0 While it would be possible to question the authority on which these early cases rest, 21 the rule is now
clearly established in many jurisdictions, and could easily serve as
the authority for introduction of a similar doctrine here. If such
reasoning were to triumph, we would at least have achieved the
same results under both subdivisions.
To recapitulate, if the interpretations recommended above
are adopted under each subdivision the determination of whether
to distribute per capita or per stirpes will be governed exclusively
by the degree of kindred of the heirs. If they are not all of the same
degree, the root generation will be the closest generation to the
19. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTIORY CONSTRUCTION § 5209 (3rd ed. 1943). The exact extent
to which the North Dakota provision was drawn from the Massachusetts statute is difficult
to estimate, however the almost Identical language and the chronological precedence of the
Massachusetts statute would lead one to believe that there was some connection between
that and the Field Code. Attempts at codification in Massachusetts maty to some extent
have inspired David Dudley Field. See Fisch, Civil Code; Notes for an Uncelebrated Gen-

tennial, 43 N. DAK. L. REv. 485 (1967).
20. See authorities cited supra note 3.
21. KENT seems to think that this interpretation is buttressed also by British authority,
but a subsequent British case seems to refute this view. In re Ross' Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq.
286 (1871). Some of the confusion seems to result from a failure to distinguish between
the rules applicable to collaterals and those applying to issue. The Statute of Distribution
clearly and explicitly applies a modified per stirpes rule to collaterals, but not to issue.
Compare section V with section VI, 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 10 (1670).
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decedent having living members. All members of that generation
will take per capita. All other heirs will take by representing their
ancestors in the root generation.
The effect of such an interpretation would be to construe the
Code as providing for modified per stirpes distribution in all cases.
Thus in interpreting subdivision (b), when all of the issue are of
the same generation, Example 2 above, they take per capita, the
same result reached in Example 2. In Example 4, however, with
the spouse, one grandchild, GCbI, and three great grandchildren
surviving, the root generation would be that of the grandchildren, and the distribution would be: GGCa one-sixth, GCbI onesixth, and GGCbIIa and GGCbIIb one-twelfth each. In Example 3,
under subdivision (c), with only four great grandchildren surviving,
the root generation is that of the great grandchildren, and each
takes one-fourth. Subdivision (a) will be interpreted to achieve
parallel results, so that in Example 1 each great grandchild would
take one-sixth.

II. THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The status of the illegitimate child has improved vastly since
the days when the Common Law treated him as "filius nullius,"
the child of no one. Former North Dakota Century Code section
56-01-05 was typical of many of the modern statutory provisions on
the subject:
Inheritance by child born out of wedlock.-Every child
born out of wedlock is an heir of the person who in writing
signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowledges
himself to be the father of such child. In all cases such child
is an heir of his mother. He inherits the father's or mother's
estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same
manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. He, however, does not represent his father or mother by inheriting
any part of the estate of the kindred of his father or mother,
either lineal or collateral, unless before his death his parents
shall have intermarried and his father after such marriage
shall have acknowledged him as his child or adopted him
into his family. In that case such child and all the legitimate
children in such family are considered brothers and sisters
and on the death of any one of them intestate and without
issue the others, subject to the rights in the estate of such
deceased child of the father and mother, respectively, as
is provided in this code, inherit his estate as his heirs in the
same manner as if all the children had been born in wedlock.
Although more humane than the Common Law, the above provision
still discriminated against the illegitimate; he could not inherit
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from his father unless his father legitimated him, and he could not
inherit from anyone besides his father and mother unless they
married.
GENEALOGICAL CHART
Fathers.
Unknown

Karl
Christiansen
b. 11-4-1870
deceased

Emilie Jensen
Out of mwmmknee Christiansenmin Wedlock
Wedlock
b. 8-9-1851
in. 1-15-1884
d. 12-19-1895
Malsine
Christiansen
b. 12-18-1872
deceased

Lauritis
Kristensen
b. 1D-7-1876
deceased

I I Id.

George
Christiansen

Dagmar
Nielsen

Ella
.Undhjem

Agnes
I-edensten

Olivia
Peterson

Kenneth
Christensen

t

Marie
Anderson

I

Chris E.
Jensen
b. 4-14-1884
d. 7-30-1965

Magnus
Jensen
b. 9-11-1892
m. 4-18-1916

6-20-1964
Tove
Michaelsen
Niels
Preben

Jensen

Emanuel
Christensen

I

Elna
Lauritsen

NOTE:
tiansen
Jensen,
d. June

Olivia
Christiansen
Meier
b.8-4-1879

Niels Jensen
b. 2-24-1850
d. 5-28-1933

See Note
Below

In addition to the two sons shown, Emilie ChrisJensen also bore a legitimate daughter to Niels
Dagmar Marie Magdalene Jensen, b. May 30, 1887,
28, 1890.

Matters remained at this stage until the recent decision of the
22
North Dakota Supreme Court in the case of In re Estate of Jensen.
In Jensen the appellants were the illegitimate child and children
of deceased illegitimate children of Emilie Jensen, nee Christiansen.
Mrs. Jensen had married and had two legitimate children who
reached maturity, Chris and Magnus Jensen. Magnus died survived
by two children, Tove Michaelsen and Niels Jensen, the appellees.
The intestate decedent was Chris Jensen, who died without issue.
The chart below willl clarify the situation. All of the illegitimate
children emigrated from Denmark to the United States, as did the
intestate.
Upon the death of the intestate in 1965, Mrs. Undhjem, the
daughter of one of the illegitimate children of Emilie Christiansen,
was granted letters of administration for the estate of Chris Jensen,
and in 1966 she filed a petition for approval of the final report and
22.

In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N. D. 1968).
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accounting and for distribution of the residue of the estate which
permitted the illegitimates and their descendants to share with the
legitimate children or their descendants by representation. The
County Court approved the distribution, and the legitimate heirs
appealed to the District Court of Burke County. The latter court
decided that N.D.C.C. section 56-01-05 prohibited the illegitimate
branches of the family from taking, and entered judgment for
the legitimate branches. After entry of the judgment of the District
Court, the illegitimate branches obtained new counsel, and moved
to vacate the judgment under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
60(b). The basis of the motion was that the failure of the first
counsel to investigate the rules of Denmark to see whether or not
the ancestors of the appellants might not really have been legitimate constituted "mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect."
The new counsel also wished to raise the issue of the unconstitutionality of section 56-01-05 before the trial court at a new trial. Upon a
denial of the motion to vacate the judgment, appeal was sought
alleging abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to vacate
the judgment.
Upon appeal, Judge Erickstad held, in a very able opinion,
that failure to vacate the judgment in order to hear the constitutional issue was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
He then went on to treat the issue of the constitutionality of the
statute as being raised on appeal, and to find section 56-01-05 unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution.
The procedural issues which occupy most of Judge Erickstad's
opinion need not detain us here. The matter of principal interest
is the holding that section 56-01-05 is unconstitutional as an unreasonable classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal Constitution and also the equivalent thereof in the North
Dakota Constitution.
Judge Erickstad based his decision principally on the recently
decided case of Levy v. Louisiana 3 in the United States Supreme
Court. That case held unconstitutional a wrongful death statute,
which, as interpreted by the courts of Louisiana, denied illegitimates
the right to recover for the wrongful death of a parent, but permitted
such recovery to legitimate children or illegitimates who had been
acknowledged by the parent. The basis of the Levy decision is
that biological and psychological relationships must be considered
in determining the rights of children, and that the traditional legal
distinctions observed in family law cannot by themselves be the
basis for discrimination against the illegitimate. The law can thus
23.

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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no longer overlook the fact that a child is the child of his natural
parent and fail to extend him rights accorded other children simply
because his parents have failed to abide by the formalities prescribed for recognition of children.
Judge Erickstad's opinion, covering an intestate succession law
rather than a wrongful death statute, follows naturally from the
Levy case, and would have been difficult to avoid after the latter
opinion. There would appear to be no logical distinction between
the wrongful death statute and the intestate succession statute for
this purpose.
The Jensen case should not even prove controversial. As Judge
Erickstad's analysis of the legislative history of the matter demonstrates, as long ago as 1917 North Dakota equalized the rights of all
children, both legitimate and illegitimate, and that situation was
only changed by some most astonishing legislative bungling. As a
result of the Jensen opinion, we are now advancing to the standards of fifty years ago.2 4 The legislature has just re-enacted the
1917 statute repealed by accident; even including a typographical
error (although changing "it" and "its" to "he" and "his"):
Every child is hereby declared to be the legitimate child
of his natural parents and is entitled to support and education, to the same extent as if it had been born in lawful
wedlock. He shall inherit from his natural parents
and from
25
their kindred heir [sic], lineal and collateral.
This provision will pose problems when a child suddenly appears after the death of the putative father, claiming a share in
the estate, and a very high burden of proof will have to be established to prevent abuses. There may also be a problem of pretermitted illegitimate heirs which did not previously arise, which
await either judicial gloss or legislative action. Until these matters
are clarified, estate planners will have to choose their words with
some care in any case where such a contingency might arise.

III.

THE STATUS

OF THE MINOR HEIR

Subdivision 56-01-04(4) (b), dealing with the status of the minor
heir, is a curious subdivision, being, as it is, included with subdivision (a) which has nothing to do with the topic of subdivision
(b). Subdivision (4) (b) reads:
4. If the decedent leaves:
24. In re Estate of Jensen, supra note 22, at 868-69.
25. Senate Bill 264 (1969). Compare Laws of North Dakota (1917),
id. at 868.
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b. Several children, or one child and the issue of one
or more children, and any such surviving child dies under
age without having been married, all the estate that came
to the deceased child by inheritance from such decedent
descends in equal shares to the other children of the
same parent, and the issue of any such other children who
are dead, by right of representation ...
Subdivision 4(b) is also supplemented by division 5, which provides
for the case arising when all other children of the parents of the
minor heir are dead, but have left issue. It really adds nothing
to subdivision 4(b) and indeed only complicates matters by including a Maud v. Catherwood provision which poses the same
interpretational difficulties already discussed.
Subdivision 4(b) leaves many questions unanswered. Its aim is
salutary: To redistribute the share in the decedent's estate among
surviving children or issue when the minor heir does not survive
long enough to make provisions for its disposition himself. This
provision prevents the share of the surviving spouse in the deceased spouse's estate from being increased as the heir of his
child. Furthermore, section 30-21-06 provides that when such minor
heir dies before the close of administration of the parent's estate,
no administration will be had of the minor's estate, but all that share
coming from the parent will be distributed to the other children.
Thus double administration expenses are avoided. Unfortunately, in
spite of its meritorious objectives, subdivision (4) (b) leaves two
basic questions unanswered: The position of the minor heir dying
testate and the position of the illegitimate child of the minor heir.
The position of the testate minor heir is completely anomalous
under the North Dakota statutes. Section 56-02-01 of the Code specifies that any person of the age of eighteen or older may make a
will disposing of all or any part of his property. We are thus faced
with a problem which can be illustrated with the following
example: Frank Intestate dies leaving a son, Sam, aged three,
and a daughter, Dolores, age two. Sam's share of Frank's estate
is one million dollars. Some fiffteen years later Sam enters the
service, and before being sent to a war zone makes a will leaving
everything to his fiancee (this problem is not far-fetched; servicemen are now encouraged and given every aid in making wills in
such situations by their commanders, whereas it might not
ordinarily occur to one of that age bracket to make such a will).
When Sam, at the age of nineteen, without being married, is
killed in Viet Nam, who takes the one million dollar estate which
descended to him from his father? It seems that under subdivision
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(4) (b) Sam had some sort of contingent estate in the property,
which could only become absolute upon his reaching the age of
twenty-one. Therefore, although Sam could make a will at age
eighteen, apparently nothing passed under it to his fiancee. Instead,
subdivision (4) (b) divested Sam of his interest upon his death, and
all of his interest must be distributed to Dolores.
It is submitted that this result is absurd. First, the result
does not serve any conceivable statutory purpose, and indeed is in
conflict with the expressed policy of allowing eighteen-year olds
to dispose of their own property. Second, it is clearly against all
judicial policies favoring early vesting of estates.
Once again, there appear to be no North Dakota cases on the
subject, and none in any other jurisdiction having a similar statute.
The language of the statute, however, may provide a way out of
the old dilemma. Section 56-01-04 is expressly limited by its own
language to cases involving intestacy:
When any person having title to any estate not otherwise
limited by marriage contract dies without disposing of the
estate by will, it is succeeded to and must be distributed,
unless otherwise expressly provided in this code, subject
to the payment of his debts, in the following manner. ...
Because of this provision, it would seem that the operation of
section 56-01-04 could be restricted to the case where the child of
the intestate also dies intestate.
There are further compelling reasons for reaching this result.
If we treat the estate as one subject to contingency or subsequent
divestiture, upon death of the minor heir endless accounting problems could arise. Until the heir safely married or reached majority,
his administrator or executor might be required to deliver up every
penny received from the parent's estate to the surviving siblings
or issue thereof. If we treat the estate as fully vested, we may
then read the statute as requiring transmission only of whatever
remains of the parent's estate. Even here we may have problems, but they will not impose so severe a burden on the guardian
and executors or administrators of the minor's estate.
The interplay of subdivision (4) (b) and the provisions for illegitimates also poses problems. If a minor becomes the parent
of an illegitimate child, that child will inherit from the minor under
the Michaelsen doctrine, as he would have in many instances under
the old statute law. If the minor heir-parent dies then before reaching twenty-one and without marrying, all the estate coming to the
minor heir-parent from his predeceased parent goes not to the illegitimate child, but to the brothers and sisters of the minor heir-
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parent and their issue. It appears almost impossible to avoid
this result on the basis of the language of the statute, but it is
submitted that it is desirable to avoid this result. The statute
clearly did not have this situation in mind. Furthermore, such a
result may well be unconstitutional under the Michaelsen case
as undue discrimination against the illegitimate.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis indicates that there are areas of the intestate succession law which are vague and which require legislative
'clarification. Until such clarification is achieved, the practitioner
will have to exercise considerable care in drawing wills and trusts.
Whenever residuary and remainder clauses are involved, the practitioner should be aware of these problems, and should provide
for them specifically. The tendency to use a form which simply
provides for distribution according to the laws of intestate suc.
cession can easily lead to endless problems and litigation expense.

